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 1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore what impact, if any, government
debts have on achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for
the Indian states. The MDGs specify the target levels to be achieved for a
set of speci￿c indicators by 2015. By addressing a broad range of indicators
such as income poverty, health, literacy, gender, environment, with strong
interlinkages between them, the UN general assembly which rati￿ed the
MDGs, hoped to bring about a reduction in the overall level of deprivation
in the world (UN 2000). The goals are ambitious. Among others it calls for
halving of poverty, illiteracy, and infant mortality by 2015. This, however,
also means that to ful￿ll the goals, national governments, especially in the
developing world, have to undertake major investments in the social sector.
But how much they will really be able to do, will depend on the conditions
of their ￿nances, which therefore, indirectly determine the success of the
MDGs.
Taking government debt as one of the indicators of their ￿nancial condi-
tion, in this paper we look into the ability of governments for increased and
sustained expenditure in the social sectors. Typically one would presume
that large government debts are incurred in subsidizing health or educa-
tion programmes or direct poverty eradication programmes. Therefore, an
increased government debt would re￿ ect an increased involvement of the
government in such programmes. Thus higher debt will alleviate poverty.
This, however, is not at all obvious. If interest payments on debts are high,
a country may easily slip in to a debt trap, where it is incurring larger debts
just to be able to pay its previous debts. Higher debt may persuade govern-
ments to reduce some of their social programmes which may have directly
bene￿tted the poor. In such circumstances debt will increase poverty. For
the Indian states, in a series of papers Besley and Burgess (2000), Besley
and Burgess (2004), Burgess and Pande (2005) have discussed how institu-
1tional environments, business climate and access to ￿nance impact poverty,
however, the role of government ￿nances in poverty reduction has not been
studied so far. In this paper we will assess both the direction and the mag-
nitude of the e⁄ects of debt on poverty and place it in the context of having
sustainable poverty reduction in the long run and thus achieving the MDG
with respect to poverty.
Given the large concentration of poor and deprived in South Asia, the
performance of this region becomes crucial to the achievements of the MDGs
(World Bank 2006). In India, which is the largest country in the region,
due to the federal nature of the political system, the constitution separates
the responsibilities of the centre and the states. The centre and the states
each have a list of areas which are under their direct control and there is also
a concurrent list for which both the centre and the states are responsible.1
Most of the MDGs fall under the concurrent list or the state list. Hence,
for our study we have focussed on the Indian states. Moreover, given the
di⁄erences between the states in India, both in terms of economic growth and
quality of life indicators, such state level analysis provides a more realistic
base to study the progress towards the MDGs.
In studying poverty in India, therefore, it is important to assess the state
governments￿role and capabilities. For instance, according to news reports
(The Telegraph, 19 November, 2004) in Orissa, which is one of the poorer
states, ￿ the government debt was 63 per cent of the state￿ s gross production
and 329 percent of its total revenue in 2003-04. Salary bills, pension and
interest payments on loans are a whopping 77 per cent of the state￿ s annual
expenditure￿ . This is not just the case for the poorer states; many other
states in India face similar situations. West Bengal, relatively a medium
level state in terms of its achievements, spends around 46 per cent of its
1The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India contains the lists of activities that
come under the center or the state. For more details refer to the Government of India
website: http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/welcome.html
2total receipts including tax, non-tax and loan receipts, to service debts. Its
expenditure on salary, pensions and loan repayments is more than 100 per
cent of its total revenue.2 Obviously, this does not leave much room for
development related expenditures. In a more rigorous study of the public
sector debts in India, Kochar (2004) notes that ￿ India has among the most
largest and most intractable ￿scal imbalances in the world￿ . Rangarajan and
Srivastava (2003) recommend a reduction in the level of the primary de￿cits
so that over all the debt can be sustainable. In fact taking account of
hidden subsidies and future commitments by the various state governments,
the debt burden takes on a serious magnitude notwithstanding the assets
of the governments. In their study comparing Indian government ￿nances
with other emerging markets, Roubini and Hemming (2004) ￿nds that India
faces a higher risk of a debt crisis due to its huge debt burden. Recognizing
the gravity of the issue and its potential to create severe macroeconomic
imbalances, the Twelfth Finance Commission of India has recommended
a radical restructuring of the state level debts to reduce the overall debt
burden (Bagchi 2005; Kurian 2005).
Although there are several dimensions of the MDGs, we have chosen to
study income poverty in particular. Apart from its importance within the
MDGs, it is also one of the most studied indicators for the Indian states.
Further, detailed data on poverty for each state has been collected for all
states in India for several years. However, we should point out that the
methodology used in this paper can be equally applied to study the impact
of government debt on any other MDG indicators. The plan of our paper
is as follows. In the next section we discuss the data and the methodology
that we will use. Section 3 is about the results and the analysis. Section 4,
discusses some simulation results and the ￿nal section highlights the main
implications of the results.
2Bengal on the Verge of Debt trap. The Telegraph, 8 February, 2005.
32 Debt and MDGs
The literature describing how debt and the MDGs are related is limited.
Not all of the MDGs will be a⁄ected by the government￿ s ￿scal policy. For
instance, government debt may not have any bearing on the goal of achiev-
ing gender equality in both primary and secondary education, but it will
certainly a⁄ect the goal of halving poverty and hunger, achieving univer-
sal education and reducing child mortality by two thirds. Any goal that
may require a government to pour in resources will be a⁄ected by the condi-
tions of the government￿ s ￿nances. Given our interest on the goal of halving
poverty, we look at how debt a⁄ects economic growth since economic growth
a⁄ects poverty reduction.
There are several channels through which debt can impact economic
growth. First, higher debt increases the possibility of higher taxes in the
future, which in turn dampens long term investments. Investors may di-
vert resources to short term investment and may hold back on any current
investment. This can lead to a case of reduced e¢ ciency along with a lower
level of investment (Br￿uninger, 2002). All these may cause ￿ debt overhang￿
where the states ability to honour its future debt commitments may be lower
than its actual debt. In turn, this may create an environment of economic
uncertainty and the possibility of capital ￿ ight increases substantially, lead-
ing to a decrease in growth and hence in poverty alleviation. The empirical
evidence on debt overhang, however, remains inconclusive.3
On the other hand, under a Keynesian approach, debt can have a positive
impact on growth by generating demand and creating employment. This is
particularly apt for developed countries under depression. How much this
theory is applicable to developing countries, where the problem is not just
the lack of demand, is arguable. Although the causal direction between
3See the discussions in Clements et al. (2003) on how debt can e⁄ect growth. Although
they mainly focussed on external debt, the analysis will also be valid for total debt that
includes both domestic and external debt.
4debt and economic growth may be di¢ cult to establish, economic theory
also predicts that higher public debt lowers savings and thus increases in-
terest rates. The increased interest rates then reduce growth through a
reduction in investments. Kochar (2004) shows that public debt in India
has been ￿nanced through private savings. This has allowed India to avoid
signi￿cant external imbalances and in￿ ationary pressures but has forced the
government to o⁄er an interest rate much higher than the market, thus
making the public debt even more unsustainable. A higher debt also leads
to reduction in the availability of credit for private investments and given
that private investments are more e¢ cient, this reduces the overall level of
growth (Easterly 2004).
When it comes to debt and poverty, apart from the indirect impact of
debt on poverty through economic growth, there is also the direct e⁄ect when
governments with high debt curtail their social expenditures. For instance,
IMF (2000) shows that for many of the highly indebted poor countries, a
reduction in their debts has led to an increase in social expenditure that
in addition to health and education includes spending on basic sanitary
infrastructure, water supply and rural development. The direct impact of
debt on social expenditure crucially a⁄ects the MDGs since most of the goals
implicitly rely on government investments. For instance, to ensure univer-
sal primary education, the government needs to expand schools, hire more
teachers and provide teaching tools; all these require substantial investment
in education. Similarly, to reduce child mortality and achieve improvement
in maternal health, governments in developing countries have to undertake
more investment in the health care sector. If higher debt reduces such in-
vestments, clearly then, it a⁄ects the achievements of the goals. In India
with increased debt, the social expenditure decreased from 6.7 per cent in
1990-91 to 5.2 per cent in 2004-05 (Ghosh 2005). Typically, many of the
government social expenditures are availed by the poor who lose out most
5when expenditures are curtailed. Reduction in government involvement in
these areas may prompt more private sector investment but the poor may
be priced out of availing from such services.
Further, as Kochar (2004) argues, the increased public debt in India
has led to a change in the composition of revenue expenditures. A higher
proportion of government revenue is going towards ￿nancing the debt. Gov-
ernments investment in infrastructure has reduced and in turn has led to a
slow down in economic growth. Lahiri (2003) shows that the level of debt in
India is high compared to international standards and discusses the reasons
behind the persistence of debt and how it impedes ￿scal reforms. Kochar
(2004) goes on to summarize that such increased levels of public debt has
lead to a reduction in growth potential ￿ through deterioration in the qual-
ity of public expenditure, limitations on the room for macroeconomic policy
maneuver and on the scope for further structural reforms and liberalization￿ .
3 Methodology
Our aim here is to understand whether debt does help or hinder the achieve-
ment of the MDGs poverty target. We proceed in two steps. First we
empirically estimate the impact of government debt on poverty. The esti-
mated equation may also involve other variables which matter for poverty
reduction, such as GDP or health expenditure. Then we derive the trend
values of those variables along with debt, for 2007 and 2015. Using the
estimated equation, and the derived trend values, we predict the levels of
poverty for di⁄erent states for 2007 and 2015.
For the ￿rst step, since we have a panel data set, we run both the ￿xed
e⁄ects and the random e⁄ects regressions. The ￿xed e⁄ect regression that
we estimate is
lnpit = ￿i + dt + ￿ lnXit + uit (1)
6where ￿i captures the state speci￿c e⁄ects, pit is the poverty head count
ratio for state i in year t, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables such as
government debt, per capita health expenditure, per capita income and per
capita electricity consumption. dt is a year dummy which takes into account
year speci￿c e⁄ects. uit is the error term. Similarly the random e⁄ects
regression is as follows
lnpit = ￿ + dt + ￿ lnXit + "i + uit (2)
where "i v N(0;￿2
") represents the state speci￿c random e⁄ects.
In this paper our interest lies in estimating the impact of debt on poverty
reduction. Even if one ￿nds a positive association between debt and poverty
(that is, higher debt increases poverty) it still does not re￿ ect causality from
debt to poverty since an increased poverty may have lead to an increased
debt. Additionally, this may raise an issue of endogeneity, since it is possible
that debt itself may be e⁄ected by the poverty. It is important, however,
to distinguish between ￿scal de￿cit and debt. Although higher poverty in
the current period may increase the de￿cit through more government ex-
penditure to combat poverty, this increased de￿cit will lead to an increased
government debt only in the future. Therefore, the current period poverty
and current period debt are not directly related and hence issues of endo-
geneity does not arise. Note that we have used evidence from the literature
(Kochar, 2004) in modelling the causal direction from debt to poverty.
The next step is to use the estimated equation to derive the impact of
debt on poverty. We use the following equation,
ln b piT = ￿￿
i + ￿￿ ln b XiT;
where b piT is the predicted level of poverty in time T, ￿￿
i ￿￿ are estimated
coe¢ cients (derived from equations (1) or (2)), and b XiT represents the trend
7levels of the explanatory variables at T. For our purposes we consider
T = 2007 and T = 2015.
3.1 Data
The main data that we use to estimate equations (1) and (2) is for 25 states
in India for 1993 and 1999.4 We describe the data below.
For poverty we have the head count ratio for each of the 32 states and
union territories in India from 1973-74 to 1999-2000, for, on average, every
￿ve years. These are based on the National Sample Surveys; our particular
data comes from the Economic Survey of Delhi 2001-02. For 1999-2000
the data was collected using both a 30-day recall period and a 7-day recall
period. We have used the 30 day recall period for our case, because it is
closer to most of the adjusted estimates that various studies have pointed
out.5 For calculating the trend of poverty for di⁄erent states we have
considered the whole data set from 1973 onwards, but we have used only
the data for 1993-94 and 1999-2000 for estimating equations (1) and (2).
The main reason for doing so is the limited data we have with regards to
government debt, health expenditure and other variables of interest.
As an indicator of government debts, we consider the ratio of debt to
gross state domestic product (GSDP) in each state. Simply considering the
level of debt is not su¢ cient, since it does not give an indication of the pay-
ing capability of the government. By taking the ratio of debt to GSDP, we
get a fair idea of the burden of the debt on the government. We have this
information from the report of the Twelfth Finance Commission for each
state from 1993-94 to 2002-03 for every year. The debt includes internal
debts, loans, advances from the central government, provident funds and
insurance funds. Since our intention here is to investigate how government
debt a⁄ects poverty reduction, we also need to control for government ex-
4All the data used in this paper are available from www.indiastat.com
5For a discussion of the issues in this context refer to Popli et al. (2005).
8penditure in the social sector. We take government expenditure on health
as a close indicator of the government￿ s expenditure in the social sector.
For 25 states we have data from 1950-51 to 2001-02, on per capita state
government expenditure on health, on average, for every ￿ve years. Not all
states have information on all years.
Based on previous studies (Datt and Ravallion 1998) we also take into
account other variables of interest which may help explain poverty, such as
per capita real GSDP and per capita electricity consumption. While per
capita GSDP has a direct impact on poverty, variables such as electricity
consumption re￿ ect the level of infrastructural facilities in the state. For
the 25 states we have data on per capita GSDP for 1993-94 and 1999-2000.
For one state, Mizoram, real per capita GSDP or net domestic product for
1999-2000 is unavailable. For per capita electricity consumption we have
data for di⁄erent states for 1990-91, 1994-95 and 1999-2000. Since we
are interested in the year 1993-94, using data from1990-91 and 1994-95, we
derive the values for 1993-94 through linear interpolation. Another variable
of interest is literacy. Datt and Ravallion (1998) show that literacy plays
an important role in explaining why some states have been more successful
at reducing poverty. From the Department of Education, Government of
India, we have data for 1991, 1997 and 2001. We derive the literacy rates
for 1993-94 and 1999-2000 through linear interpolation.
4 Results and Analysis
In order to estimate the factors that e⁄ect poverty, we consider several
possible models each with di⁄erent control variables. The results here are
based on a panel data for 25 Indian states for 1993-94 and 1999-2000. Table
1 shows the results which are estimated using a random e⁄ects model. We
also calculate the Breusch-Pagan test to check for the validity of the models.
9We will consider the ￿xed e⁄ect estimation later.
[Insert Table 1.]
The ￿rst column in Table 1 shows the regression of the log of the head
count ratio on the log of debt ratio. The negative and signi￿cant time
dummy implies that there is a decreasing trend in poverty, i.e. over time
poverty is decreasing in the Indian states. Also, the coe¢ cient of the log
of the debt ratio is signi￿cant and positive, which implies that increased
debt will increase poverty. This result is not very obvious. Higher debt
can also mean lower poverty through higher employment from increased
government expenditure. However, clearly the poor are not bene￿tting from
any increased government debt. One explanation for such an occurrence
may be that for many of the states, expenditure on salaries, pensions and
loan payments is already close to 100 per cent of revenue. Further increase
in debt is resulting from expenditure that is not necessarily targeted at the
poor. This trend decrease in poverty holds true for all the models in Table
1. Compared to other single explanatory variable models, such as Models
2 and 3, Model 1 has a higher R2. The Breusch-Pagan test con￿rms that
the random error model may be appropriate in this case.
The second column in Table 1 shows the regression of the log of the head
count ratio on the log of per capita health expenditure. The coe¢ cient of
the log of the per capita health is highly signi￿cant and negative indicating
that as health expenditure is increased poverty will be reduced. It provides
an argument for continuing and increased government investment in the
social sector. The Breusch-Pagan test show that the random e⁄ect model
is appropriate. In column 3, we run the same regression but with per
capita real GSDP as the control variable. The coe¢ cient is negative and
signi￿cant. In fact, if the regression is run without the time dummy, the
elasticity is close to one. Note also that the reduction in poverty through
10income growth is almost twice that from increased government expenditure
in the social sector.
The next column controls for both log of health expenditure and log of
the debt ratio. The coe¢ cient of both the log of the debt ratio and the log
of the health expenditure is signi￿cant. However, the coe¢ cient of log of
health expenditure is negative and the coe¢ cient of the log of the debt ratio
is positive. This implies that after controlling for social expenditure, as the
debt burden increases, poverty also goes up. But an interesting di⁄erence
between Model 1 and Model 4 is that the elasticity of debt ratio on poverty
is higher in Model 1, which implies that once the level of health expenditure
is controlled, increase in debt just increases poverty at a higher rate.
Column 5 takes into account per capita GSDP in addition to log of
health expenditure and log of the debt ratio. The coe¢ cient of both the log
of the debt ratio and the log of the health expenditure is signi￿cant with a
positive and negative sign respectively. But unlike other studies we ￿nd that
coe¢ cient of the per capita GSDP, though positive, is insigni￿cant. It shows
that at least for the Indian states, after controlling for health expenditure,
increase in income does not make a signi￿cant dent on poverty. This brings
to the fore the role of government expenditure in tackling poverty.
Column 6 which controls for log of per capita electricity consumption
along with log of per capita health expenditure and log of the debt ratio,
shows that the elasticity of both electricity consumption and health ex-
penditure are signi￿cant and negative whereas debt is insigni￿cant. If we
consider per capita electricity consumption to be proxy for mechanization
and therefore higher productivity, then with a greater increase in electricity
we should see a reduction in poverty. It may be that government debt is re-
sulting from spending in infrastructure and once we take that into account,
the impact of debt becomes insigni￿cant. However, note that in this case
the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the random e⁄ects model at 5 per cent level
11of signi￿cance.
Table 2 shows the ￿xed e⁄ect estimation for the same regressions as in
Table 1.
[Insert Table 2.]
It is clear from Table 2 that most of the results are similar to the random
e⁄ects model in Table 1. In the ￿xed e⁄ects case, health expenditure reduces
poverty, higher debt increases poverty. Also, we see (Model 11) that log of
per capita GSDP is insigni￿cant when we control for both log of the debt
ratio and log of per capita health expenditure. There are, however, several
notable di⁄erences between Tables 2 and 1. Interestingly in Model 9, in
contrast to the random e⁄ect models, the per capita GSDP is positive but
insigni￿cant, indicating that GSDP per capita may have a limited role in
reducing poverty. Another di⁄erence lies in the higher debt elasticity of
poverty under the ￿xed e⁄ect than the random e⁄ect model. Within the
￿xed e⁄ect models, the debt elasticity of poverty is more than twice that of
other variables such as GDP per capita or health expenditure. Further, the
debt elasticity of poverty is greater than one, which shows that an increase
in debt more than increases poverty. Clearly, debt is not being incurred
to undertake programmes to combat poverty; instead it is being used in a
manner that exacerbate poverty. Hence, debt will be a dominating factor
e⁄ecting poverty. Interestingly for the ￿xed e⁄ect models, the time trend
is not always signi￿cant, which shows that once we take the state speci￿c
e⁄ects into account, the time e⁄ects may not be that important. Thus inter
state di⁄erences matter more than di⁄erences over time. Further there is
also a di⁄erence between the two tables for Model 6. For the random e⁄ects
model, log of debt ratio became insigni￿cant when we controlled for log of
per capita electricity consumption, whereas in the ￿xed e⁄ects case it is the
opposite. While log of debt ratio is signi￿cant here, the log of per capita
electricity consumption becomes insigni￿cant.
12Although we have not reported the results here, unlike other studies,
we have found that literacy does not have a signi￿cant impact on poverty,
especially in the presence of log per capita health expenditure.
4.1 MDG: 2007 and 2015
We choose the random e⁄ects estimation of Model 1, Model 2 and Model 4,
to deduce the impact of debt on achieving the MDG with respect to poverty.
Model 4 is chosen because it is the most parsimonious model with a good ￿t.
Models 1 and 2 on the other hand will give us good comparative scenarios, by
showing the e⁄ects of debt and health expenditure respectively, on poverty.
Broadly, we can then discuss two cases: one, the impact of government
investment in the social sector on poverty and two, the impact on poverty
as such when we take into account government debt. Model 1 will be useful
to compare the e⁄ect of debt on poverty, when we do not control for social
expenditures.
Tables 3 and 4 gives the details of the predicted poverty for 2007 and
2015 for a smaller set of 16 states. These 16 major states comprise of 95
per cent of India￿ s population. Note, however, our estimated equation is
based on a larger number of states. First we discuss Table 3.
[Insert Table 3.]
The ￿rst column reports the level of poverty in 1999-2000; the level of
poverty at the beginning of the millennium. Using a linear trend the next
column reports the level of poverty that has to be attained by 2007 to be
in line with achieving the MDG with respect to poverty by 2015. In the
third column, using the poverty data from 1973-74 to 1999-2000 and ￿tting
a linear trend, we derive the trend values of the head count ratios for the 16
states in 2007. The fourth, ￿fth and the sixth columns shows the predicted
13values of poverty in 2007 using Model 1, Model 2 and Model 4 respectively.
The values for the log of health expenditure and log of the debt ratio are
the trend values of those variables for 2007.
There are several features that stand out. The ￿rst is that the un-
weighted average for the 2007 MDG poverty target is around 17 per cent
and all the three models show that on average, India will be able to meet its
MDG target of 2007. In fact according to Model 1, which tracks the e⁄ect
of debt, India will be within the MDG target for 2007 thus indicating that
in the medium term state government debt may not have much of a negative
consequence on poverty. Further, if we just take into account the impact
of government investment in the social sector, most of the major states in
India will be in line with the 2007 MDG. However, there are variations
within states. Surprisingly, some of the richer states such as Gujarat and
Punjab, and also states such as Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, are the ones
that cannot meet the MDG target levels by 2007 and may indeed see an
increase in poverty. A large part of the reduction in poverty is coming from
poorer states like Assam, Bihar and Orissa.
But when the government debt is taken into account (Model 4) the
number of states that will not be able to meet the 2007 MDG increases.
The unweighted average of the predicted poverty is now close to the average
of the poverty trend, which is 17 per cent. Some states such as Bihar,
Orissa, Rajasthan, West Bengal which by Models 1 and 2 were well within
the MDG target, are now way above it. If we just considered the health
expenditure, West Bengal would have reduced its poverty from 27 per cent in
2000 to 13 per cent by 2007: well below the 2007 MDG target of 20 per cent.
But when we take the debt into account, West Bengal￿ s poverty increases
to 21 per cent. In the case of Bihar the jump in poverty is the largest,
from 17 per cent when just health expenditure is considered to 35 per cent
when debt is taken into account. What is interesting here is that on their
14own, both debt and health expenditure seems to be able to reduce poverty
signi￿cantly. But when we look at the e⁄ect of debt while controlling for
the level of health expenditure, poverty increases dramatically.
One of the anomalies in our empirics is the increase in poverty in Punjab
and Gujarat, which are generally deemed to be the richer states. In a
broader sense one may question why some of the ￿ better￿states such as
Gujarat, Punjab and Kerala are not able to meet their MDG targets whereas
the poorer states such as Assam, Bihar and Orissa are able to do so. The
answer to some extent lies in our modelling structure. Since we are using
log linear models, it implies that states with already low levels of poverty
will need to put in more in terms of their investing in health and lowering
of debt to reduce poverty than states with high levels of poverty. Hence
we see a dramatic decline in poverty for the poorer states. However, this
also means that over time as the level of poverty comes down it will become
di¢ cult to achieve further reductions in poverty.
This is highlighted in Table 4, which provides the same information as
in Table 3 but for 2015.
[Insert Table 4.]
Considering Model 4 (column 6) eleven out of the sixteen Indian states will
clearly not be able to meet the MDGs. The average predicted poverty is
around 15 per cent while the MDG target is around 11 per cent. Inter-
estingly if the trend expenditure on health continues, the predicted poverty
(Model 2 in column 5) will be well within the MDG targets. Note that
under Model 1, which just takes the debt ratio into account, the predicted
poverty will increase and the level of poverty is higher than the MDG tar-
gets. It is apparent that high public sector debts in the long run are going
to make a heavier impact on increasing poverty. However, the experience
between the states is not uniform. As expected, states such as Maharastra
and Karnataka are showing the greatest decrease in poverty. On the other
15hand, for states such as Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab and
Rajasthan, overall poverty in 2015 will be higher than in year 2000. For
West Bengal, poverty will increase in 2015 to 23 per cent from 21 per cent in
2007. This is because, although from the trend levels of health expenditure
poverty should decline, this is being countered by the increase in government
debts. In fact since the elasticity of debt ratio is higher than that of health
expenditure for similar increases in debt and health expenditure, we will see
an overall increase in poverty.
Comparing our predictions with the trend levels of poverty (Table 4,
column 3) we ￿nd for states with low levels of poverty, such as Kerala and
Punjab, while the trend predictions for 2015 indicate that these states will
meet the MDG targets, our predictions show that they will not do so. For
Kerala, although the expenditure on health is signi￿cant, it is the increased
levels of debt ratio that may hamper the poverty alleviation programme.
Punjab, with both high trend levels of debt ratio and low trend levels of
health expenditure, thus may end up with a higher poverty in 2015 than in
2000. There are also states like Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu where
the trend predictions from column 3 show that they will not be able to meet
their MDGs for poverty but in our calculations they will be able to ful￿ll
the targets.
5 Simulation
Our predicted levels of poverty depended on the forecasted levels of debt and
health expenditure. The forecasts were done by ￿tting a linear trend on a
longer time series of these variables. However, it is quite probable that the
forecasts will not match with the realized values, especially when the forecast
period gets longer. Therefore in this section we discuss the predicted levels
of poverty for 2015 based on Model 4, under di⁄erent scenarios of debt and
health expenditure. In particular we consider four cases each for debt ratio
16and health expenditure levels. In Table 5 we consider the four cases where
the debt ratio increases (and decreases) by 10 per cent and 25 per cent from
the trend values, with the health expenditure remaining unchanged at the
trend levels.
[Insert Table 5.]
As is obvious, an increase in debt will take the Indian states further away
from achieving the MDG poverty targets. Note that in 2015, given the trend
levels of debt ratio and health expenditure, the Indian states on average will
anyway not be able to reduce poverty by half. Hence, increasing the debt
ratio will make that task even harder. But more interestingly a reduction
of the debt ratio by 10 per cent from the trend values still does not reduce
poverty to within the MDG target. In this case, the predicted poverty
average is around 13.5 per cent whereas the MDG target is 11.5 per cent.
With a 25 per cent decrease in the debt ratio, on average the Indian states
will come close to achieving the MDG targets although the goal remains
unattainable for many states such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and West
Bengal among others. Of the poorer states in 2000, Assam is the only state
where with an increase in debt ratio by 25 per cent, it will still be within
its MDG targets. Even though Assam￿ s trend rate of increase in health
expenditure is not high, its trend rate of increase in debt ratio is among the
lowest. Given that debt ratio has a more dominant e⁄ect on poverty than
health expenditure, Assam is able to achieve the intended goals.
Next we perform the same exercise for health expenditure levels. Using
Model 4, we predict the level of poverty in 2015, when health expenditure is
changed (increased and decreased) by 10 and 25 per cent. The results are
reported in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6.]
As expected higher health expenditure reduces poverty. But even with a
1725 percent increase in the health expenditure levels, ten out of the sixteen
Indian states fail to meet the goals. On the other hand a 25 per cent
decrease in the health expenditure will lead poverty to increase to 17.5 per
cent, which is quite close to the level of poverty predicted with a 25 per cent
increase in debt. Although the health (expenditure) elasticity of poverty
is lower than that of the debt ratio, this similarity in the level of poverty
between a 25 per cent increase in debt and health expenditure arises because,
given the log transformation of the variables, a 25 per cent decrease in health
expenditure will lead to a larger change than a 25 per cent increase in the
debt ratio. Further, less states will be able to meet the MDG target with a
25 per cent increase in health expenditure (as in Table 6) compared to the
number of states that ful￿ll the goals when the debt ratio is decreased by
25 per cent (Table 5). The di⁄erences in the numbers are not large, with
Orissa being the only state which is switching under the two conditions, i.e.
it ful￿lls the goals under a 25 per cent decrease in debt ratio but not under
a 25 per cent increase in health expenditure.
What is remarkable, however, is the consistency of the number of states
that do not achieve the MDGs. In all these di⁄erent scenarios considered,
the number of states that fail to achieve the targets varies between nine
and twelve out of the sixteen. Clearly, a majority of states cannot ful￿ll
the targets. But there is no signi￿cant variation in the states that achieve
the goals and the states that do not. For instance Assam, Karnataka,
Maharastra and Tamil Nadu will always ful￿ll the goals under the di⁄erent
scenarios we have examined. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal
Pradesh, Haryana, Kerala, Rajastahan, Punjab and West Bengal though
consistently fail to achieve the goals.
186 Conclusion
Our objective in this paper was to investigate whether government debts in
India impact the ability to achieve the MDGs. The results show that debt
is a hindrance to the achievement of the MDG poverty targets. We ￿nd
strong evidence that government investment in the social sector is extremely
important to reduce poverty, but government debt burden is actually stop-
ping several states from attaining the MDGs. Increasing both debt and
health expenditure by similar percentage points will lead to an increase in
overall poverty, since debt￿ s marginal impact on increasing poverty is more
than health￿ s impact on reducing poverty. Clearly then, a strategy of in-
creasing debt to fund health and other social expenditures may not be a
sensible policy from the point of view of reducing poverty. Therefore for
policy purposes reduction of debt should be given a priority.
We should point out that our model is based on a panel data of twenty
￿ve states over just two years. A richer data set may yield di⁄erent results.
We took health expenditures as the main indicator for social expenditures
by the government but a more comprehensive measure may be a better
predictor of poverty. Also our health expenditure data are nominal values
and there has been a signi￿cant increase in nominal health expenditure in
the recent years. This may be driving some of results where some states are
able to substantially reduce their poverty. If real expenditure on health is
considered, it is quite probable that predicted levels of poverty may be ever
higher, since the increase in real expenditure on health is going to be lower
than the increases in nominal expenditures on health. Further, we ￿nd a
remarkable consistency in the states that are able to achieve the goals and
those that do not. What the reasons behind this remarkable consistency
are, is an issue for future research.
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Table 1: Random Error models on log of the head count ratio. 
 
Model1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Log debt ratio  0.472*      0.810*  0.731*  0.314 
  (0.224)    (0.213)  (0.241)  (0.214) 
        
Log per capita 
health 
expenditure 
  -0.349* 






        
Log per capita 
GSDP 
    -0.647* 
(0.208)    -0.345 
(0.244)   
        
         




     -0.059* 
(0.014) 
        
Time  dummy  -0.094* -0.038* -0.057* -0.034* -0.029* 0.269* 
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.070) 
        
Constant  1.980* 5.119* 9.269* 3.533* 6.474* 4.547* 
  (0.738) (0.733) (1.841) (0.719) (2.218) (0.614) 
        
Number of 
Observation  50 50 50 50 50 50 
R
2  0.626 0.569 0.531 0.730 0.727 0.688 




0.001 0.001 0.003  0.0004  0.001 0.056 
Notes:  The values in the parenthesis are the robust standard errors.  * indicates 
















Table 2: Fixed effect model on log of the head count ratio. 












Log debt ratio  1.579*      1.519*  1.594*  1.368* 
 (0.475)      (0.510)  (0.474)  (0.609) 
        
Log per capita 
health expenditure    -0.677* 






        
Log per capita 
GSDP     -0.515  -0.622  
     (0.571)  (0.432)  
        
      Log per capita 
electricity 
consumption       
-0.021 
(0.015) 
        
Time  dummy  -0.127* -0.001 -0.061* -0.055  -0.046  0.089 
  (0.021) (0.033) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.533) 
        
Constant -1.652  6.618*  8.095  1.214  6.088  1.367 
  (1.540) (1.507) (5.081) (1.773) (3.134) (1.791) 
        
Number of 
Observation  50 50 50 50 50 50 
Adjusted R
2  0.823 0.737 0.705 0.846 0.848 0.848 
F-test  21.96* 14.92* 12.84* 16.47* 13.57* 13.57* 
Notes:  The values in the parenthesis are the robust standard errors.  * indicates 













Table 3: Predicted values of poverty in 2007. 
Predicted Poverty 2007 







(Model 1)  (Model 2)  (Model 4) 
Andhra 
Pradesh  15.770 11.827 11.573  9.497  12.555 12.543 
Assam 36.090  27.067  30.615 9.714 14.484  16.564 
Bihar  42.600 31.950 41.615 12.847 17.289 35.983 
Gujarat 14.070 10.552 11.646 10.719 12.142 14.599 
Haryana 8.740 6.555 8.2386 9.385 13.075  13.155 
Himachal 
Pradesh  7.630 5.722 8.405 13.922 8.138 11.705 
Karnataka 20.040  15.030 17.522  8.626  9.784  7.007 
Kerala 12.720  9.540 9.835 10.349 10.949  11.562 
Madhya 
Pradesh  37.430 28.072 31.005 10.211 14.199 17.452 
Maharashtra 25.020  18.760  22.175  8.637  12.173  10.112 
Orissa 47.150  35.362  40.818 14.761 13.392 29.784 
Punjab 6.160 4.620  4.717 9.569 11.041  10.247 
Rajasthan  15.280 11.460 14.168 12.272 12.685 19.811 
Tamil  Nadu  21.120  15.840  19.266 8.809 11.770 9.897 
Uttar 
Pradesh  31.150 23.362 28.118 11.097 14.649 21.210 
West 
Bengal  27.020 20.265 22.087 12.259 13.135 20.964 
Unweighted 
Average  22.999 17.249 20.113 10.792 12.591 16.412 
Notes:  Model 1 includes only debt, Model 2 includes only health expenditure and Model 


















Table 4:  Predicted values of poverty in 2015. 
Predicted Poverty 2015 







2015  Model 1  Model 2  Model 4 
Andhra Pradesh  15.770  7.885 8.331  11.510 9.164 10.309 
Assam  36.090  18.045  26.997  10.765 11.040 12.552 
Bihar  42.600  21.300  37.447  16.064 13.138 33.377 
Gujarat  14.070  7.035 8.234  14.652 8.946 14.985 
Haryana  8.740  4.370 5.851  11.354 9.907 11.475 
Himachal 
Pradesh  7.630 3.815  6.220  17.143  5.670  9.146 
Karnataka  20.040 10.020  13.308  10.308  6.559  4.875 
Kerala  12.720 6.360  6.295  12.155  7.978  8.978 
Madhya 
Pradesh  37.430  18.715  26.287  13.287 10.539 16.668 
Maharashtra  25.020 12.510  17.660  11.344  9.029  9.809 
Orissa  47.150  23.575  35.832  19.864 9.839 29.623 
Punjab  6.160  3.080  3.136  9.774 8.178 6.437 
Rajasthan  15.280  7.640  10.621  16.257 9.495 19.786 
Tamil Nadu  21.120 10.560  14.536  10.856  8.670  8.499 
Uttar Pradesh  31.150  15.575  23.899  13.480 10.757 17.680 
West Bengal  27.020  13.510  16.893  17.045 9.952 23.218 
Unweighted 
Average  22.999  11.499  16.347  13.491 9.304 14.839 
Notes: Model 1 includes only debt, Model 2 includes only health expenditure and Model 4 






















Table 5: Simulated values of poverty in 2015, with varied levels of debt ratio. 
Predicted Poverty in 2015 
















Andhra Pradesh  15.770 7.885  11.137  12.351  9.466  8.166 
Assam  36.090 18.045  13.559  15.038  11.525  9.943 
Bihar  42.600 21.300  36.056  39.989  30.647  26.440 
Gujarat  14.070 7.035  16.187  17.953  13.759  11.870 
Haryana  8.740 4.370  12.396  13.748  10.536  9.090 
Himachal 
Pradesh  7.630 3.815  9.881  10.958  8.398  7.245 
Karnataka  20.040 10.020  5.267  5.841  4.477  3.862 
Kerala  12.72 6.360  9.698  10.756  8.243  7.112 
Madhya 
Pradesh  37.430 18.715  18.006  19.970  15.305  13.204 
Maharashtra  25.020 12.510  10.596  11.752  9.007  7.770 
Orissa  47.150 23.575  32.000  35.491  27.200  23.466 
Punjab  6.160 3.080  6.953  7.712  5.910  5.099 
Rajasthan  15.280 7.640  21.374  23.706  18.168  15.674 
Tamil Nadu  21.120 10.560  9.181  10.183  7.804  6.733 
Uttar Pradesh  31.150 15.575  19.099  21.183  16.234  14.006 
West Bengal  27.020 13.510  25.081  27.817  21.319  18.392 
Unweighted 
Average  22.999 11.499  16.030  17.778  13.625  11.755 
Notes:  Model 4, which included both debt and health expenditure, is used to predict the 


















Table 6: Simulated values of poverty in 2015, with varied levels of health expenditure per capita. 
Predicted Poverty in 2015 





















Andhra Pradesh  15.770 7.885  9.751  9.050  10.963  12.195 
Assam  36.090  18.045  11.872 11.018 13.348 14.848 
Bihar  42.600  21.300  31.571 29.300 35.495 39.483 
Gujarat  14.070  7.035  14.174 13.154 15.936 17.726 
Haryana  8.740  4.370  10.854 10.073 12.203 13.574 
Himachal 
Pradesh  7.630  3.815  8.651 8.029 9.727 10.820 
Karnataka  20.040  10.020  4.612 4.280 5.185 5.767 
Kerala  12.720  6.360  8.492 7.881 9.547 10.620 
Madhya 
Pradesh  37.430  18.715  15.766 14.632 17.726 19.718 
Maharashtra  25.020 12.510  9.278  8.611  10.432  11.604 
Orissa  47.150  23.575  28.019 26.004 31.503 35.042 
Punjab  6.160  3.080  6.088 5.650 6.845 7.614 
Rajasthan  15.280  7.640  18.715 17.369 21.042 23.406 
Tamil Nadu  21.120  10.560  8.039 7.461 9.039 10.054 
Uttar Pradesh  31.150  15.575  16.723 15.520 18.802 20.915 
West Bengal  27.020  13.510  21.961 20.381 24.691 27.465 
Unweighted 
Average  22.999  11.499  14.035 13.026 15.780 17.553 
Notes:  Model 4, which included both debt and health expenditure, is used to predict the poverty 
under the different scenarios. 
 
 
 
 